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At the sitting of 13 March 1991 the President of the European Parliament 
announced that he had forwarded the motion for a resolution by Mr Visser, 
pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure, to the Committee on Externa 1 
Economic Relations as the committee responsible. 
At its meeting of 30 April 1991 the committee decided to draw up a report and 
appointed Mr Tsimas rapporteur. 
At its meetings of 29 November 1991, 30 January, 22 April and 20 May 1992 the 
committee considered the draft report. 
At the last meeting it adopted the resolution unanimously. · 
The following took part in the vote: De Clercq, chairman; Cano Pinto, 1st 
vice-chairman; Stavrou, 2nd vice-chairman; Junker, 3rd vice-chairman; Tsimas, 
rapporteur; Escuder Croft (for Suarez Gonzalez); Guillaume; Miranda de Lage; 
Moorhouse; Piermont; Porta (for de Vries); Raffin (for Melandri) and Visser (for Hindley). 
The report was tabled on 22 May 1992. 
The deadline for tabling amendments wi 11 appear on the draft agenda for the 
part-session at which the report is to be considered. 
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A 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on the economic and trade relations between the European Community and Indo-
China 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to its resolution of 13 October 1988 on relations between the 
European Community and the non-European countries of the CMEA, 1 
having regard to its resolution of 12 September 1991 on the situation in 
South-East Asia, 2 
having regard to the motion for a resolution by Mr VISSER on the economic 
and commercial relations between the European Community and Indochina 
(Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) (83-0047/91), 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on External Economic Relations 
(A3-0197/92), 
A. Whereas Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia are amongst the poorest of the Non-
Associated Developing Countries in Asia and Latin America (ALA 
countries), 
B. Whereas this poverty is due to the effects of colonial rule, followed by 
half-a-century of incessant warfare and, since 1975, to international 
isolation and misguided economic policies, 
C. Whereas the economic position of these countries has been further 
affected by the collapse of the CMEA (COMECON) and the demise of the 
Soviet Union, as regards the disruption of their external trade and their 
receipt of development aid, 
D. Noting that, since the European Community began its programme of aid to 
the ALA countries, while aid has been provided to Laos on a small scale, 
both Vietnam and Cambodia were excluded from this programme for political 
reasons, in particular the occupation of Cambodia by Vietnamese forces, 
1. Welcomes the recent changes in the international political situation 
which have led to the settlement of the problem of Cambodia and considers 
that the political reasons which have hitherto prevented the European 
Community from developing its relations with Vietnam and Cambodia no 
longer exist; 
2. Regrets that the European Community and the Member States have in general 
paid far too 1 ittle attention to developments in Indo-China, with the 
result that the political situation in the region and policy relating to 
it have been too one-sidedly determined by other powers; 
J No. 290 of 14.11.1988, p. 155 
2 OJ No. 287, 14.10.1991, p. 163-164 
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3. Welcomes the policies of economic reform which are being pursued in Laos, 
Vietnam and Cambodia to bring their economies increasingly into the 
international trading system; 
4. Considers that the European Community must now devote more attention to 
the countries of Indochina, as part of a more active and positive role in 
the political and economic development of South and South-East Asia; 
5. Hopes that the Commission, in view of the changed political situation in 
Indo-China, will draw up a memorandum as soon as possible on future 
Community policy in the region, covering political developments and trade 
and technical and development cooperation; hopes that the Commission will 
couple this memorandum with an action programme; 
6. Notes that the countries of Indo-China - Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia - are 
very different one from another; considers that it is of great 
importance, in addition to improving trade and cooperation with the 
countries - in view of the massive needs - to give first priority to 
large-scale aid and development cooperation, geared to each country's 
specific individual requirements; 
7. Welcomes the recent steps taken by the Commission to improve relations 
with Laos and Vietnam and to prepare aid projects for Cambodia; 
8. Calls on the Commission and Council to take all necessary steps to ensure 
that the Community can win back ground that it 1 ost by its limited 
presence in the area in the economic, trade and political fields; 
As regards Laos 
9. Welcomes the Laos Government's policy of economic liberalization by means 
of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) and attracting foreign investment, 
but notes that the lack of trained staff, inadequate infrastructure and 
the lack of an adequate legal system counteract the results; 
10. Notes that over 350 000 Laotians have fled abroad since 1975, mainly to 
Thailand; calls on the Commission and Member States to cooperate fully 
with the UNHCR voluntary return programme set up in the meantime; 
11. Regrets that despite the economic liberalization in Laos there is still 
no question of substantial domestic political reform and any form of 
political opposition is impossible; urges that under the constitution of 
August 1991 - the first in the history of Laos - political openness 
should also become a reality; 
12. Considers that the aid which has been provided by the Commission to Laos 
on a significant scale since 1988 should now be increased both in value 
and in the scope of development projects funded; 
13. Calls on the Commission to assist Laos to diversify its external trade, 
especially through trade promotion projects in the coffee, textiles and 
handicrafts sectors, and to promote tourism; 
14. Welcomes the Commission's efforts to persuade the Government of Laos to 
set up a Timber Board to improve the sustainabil ity of the forestry 
sector; 
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15. Calls on the Commission to increase its aid to Laos for training projects 
in rural development and trade promotion; 
16. Re-affirms its decision to establish inter-parliamentary relations with 
Laos; 
As regards Vietnam 
17. Expresses its appreciation of the sections of the draft constitution, to 
be decided by Vietnam's National Assembly in April 1992, concerning: 
economic reform leading towards a free market economy; 
giving the Vietnamese the right to own capital goods, set up their own 
businesses and enter into joint ventures; 
guarantees that businesses with foreign investment will not be 
nationalized; 
18. Calls on the Vietnamese Government to link this more open economic policy 
to further political reforms; 
19. Is fully aware of the enormous financial, economic and social problems in 
Vietnam, such as: 
the 600 000 demobilized soldiers, the 500 000 out-of-work officials 
and the tens of thousands of workers who have returned from Eastern 
Europe; 
the devastated and antiquated infrastructure, the massive need for 
concessional foreign loans and the US blocking of aid from the IMF, 
the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank; 
the major problems with tax collection and the enforcement of 
legislation on the regulation, protection and fostering of the 
business sector, and the continual complaints from foreign investors 
and traders about bureaucracy, corruption and rapidly changing 
legislation; 
the renewed increase in inflation and falling behind in 
growth, according to Asian Development Bank figures, 
prospects for 1992 are more favourable (economic growth 




an over-great dependence on the agricultural sector, whi eh accounts 
for 75% of employment and 50% of the GNP, although Vietnam has an 
abundance of natural resources and minerals; 
20. Points out that, according to the IMF, Vietnam has set up an exemplary 
programme of economic reform and again deserves international aid; hopes 
that the Community and Member States will make efforts to end the 
blocking of IMF, World Bank and Asian Development Bank aid to Vietnam; 
21. Welcomes the agreement between the United Kingdom, Hong Kong and Vietnam 
for the voluntary repatriation of Vietnamese refugees from Hong Kong and 
the assurance given by Vietnam that no proceedings would be initiated 
against returning refugees; notes that the funds provided by the 
Commission for the repatriation and reintegration of these refugees helps 
to stimulate the local economy in Vietnam; 
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22. Notes that, si nee the norma 1 i sat ion of re 1 at ions between the European 
Community and Vietnam, Community aid has otherwise been limited to 
funding NGO's in Vietnam; 
23. Is of the opinion that development cooperation in the following areas may 
be productive: 
help in establishing and improving infrastructure, including rural 
infrastructure; 
aid for small-scale productive employment; 
aid for health care and sanitation; 
aid for forestry; 
aid for artificial fertilizers through the United Nations food 
organization; 
extra help with debt relief through the IMF; 
extra support for refugee aid and in the return of boat people through 
the UNHCR; 
24. Calls on the Commission not to prepare aid projects for Vietnam to 
i ne 1 ude rura 1 deve 1 opment, reset t 1 ement schemes, espec i a 11 y for coffee, 
fruit cultivation and afforestation, fishery development and tourism, 
with the accent on labour intensive schemes; 
25. Calls on the Commission to supply milk products to Vietnam for deprived 
children; 
26. Calls on the Commission to provide training schemes for Vietnamese 
officials and managers both to develop Vietnam's external trade and for 
the more effective implementation of its internal economic reforms; 
27. Considers that recent political reforms in Vietnam, including 
particularly the release of most remaining political prisoners, fulfil 
the conditions for the Commission now to prepare a negotiating mandate 
for the conclusion of a framework cooperation agreement with Vietnam; 
28. Calls on the Commission, pending the opening of such negotiations, to 
conclude an agreement with Vietnam on trade in textiles; 
29. Calls on 
Delegation 
concluded; 
the Commission to 
office in Hanoi, 
make 
once 
preparations for the opening 
a cooperation agreement has 
of a 
been 
30. Re-affirms its decision to establish inter-parliamentary relations with 
Vietnam and considers that this should be effected once the new elections 
to the National Assembly have taken place; 
As regards Cambodia 
31. Expresses its sympathy for the terrible suffering to which the people of 
Cambodia have been exposed in recent years and are still undergoing, 
because of which it is a matter of honour for the international 
community, including the European Community and the Member States, to 
make a maximum contribution to the reconstruction of this deeply 
tormented country; 
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32. Welcomes the political settlement to the conflict in Cambodia concluded, 
under UN auspices, in Paris on 23 October 1991; calls on the Commission 
and on the Governments of the Member States to take such economic and 
financial measures as are required, as part of wider international 
efforts, to repatriate and rehabilitate Cambodian refugees and to 
contribute to rebuilding the country; 
33. Notes the almost complete destruction of the human, technical and 
scientific infrastructure in Cambodia and consequently considers 
immediate aid in these areas of the utmost importance; 
34. Fully endorses, therefore, the statement of the Twelve meeting in 
European Political Cooperation of 8 November 1991 to the effect that the 
international community must make all necessary efforts, through economic 
and financial assistance, to aid the repatriation and rehabilitation 
programmes and 1 ater the country's reconstruction; consequently hopes 
that the Commission will shortly produce an operational aid programme, 
whi eh should be well thought out, in view of Cambodia's temporari 1 y 
limited assimilation capacity; 
35. Has noted with appreciation Japan's proposal to hold a conference in 1992 
on the reconstruction of Cambodia; hopes that the Community wi 11 also 
play a pioneering role here; 
36. Has noted with appreciation the decisions by the Communist Party's sixth 
party conference in mid-October 1991, which included: 
establishment of multi-party democracy and abolition of the party's 
leading role (the Cambodian People's Party}; 
establishment of a free market economy instead of a central planning 
system; 
acceptance of Buddhism as the state religion with religious freedom 
for minorities; 
opening of financial markets, banks and insurance companies; 
37. Is of the opinion that aid to Cambodia from the EC and its Member States 
must at least cover the following areas: 
continuation of the present emergency aid (basic medicines, aid for 
the treatment and rehabilitation of the disabled, educational 
equipment and veterinary products}; 
continuation and expansion of rehabilitation aid (food production and 
irrigation systems, health care, water and sanitation, especially in 
urban areas, education and training and small-scale industry}; 
aid for human resources, in view of the almost complete destruction of 
human development potential; 
offering the prospect of a far-reaching reconstruction plan, including 
substantial cooperation in the return and resettlement of refugees; 
38. Welcomes the contribution already being undertaken by the European 
Community in refugee repatriation, aerial photography and mine clearance, 
as well as through NGO's; 
39. C0nsiders that the European Community can most effectively contribute to 
these efforts through the provision of food aid, humanitarian assistance 
and training and by sending doctors, vets and engineers to Cambodia; 
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40. Insists that Cambodia be given assurances that such assistance will be 
provided over a prolonged period, which is essential for the restoration 
of confidence among the people; 
General considerations 
41. Considers that Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia must be given their fair share 
of the aid which is available through the European Community's budget for 
cooperation with the ALA countries; 
42. Stresses the need to expand aid projects for financial and technical 
cooperation, and for education and training for these countries, as well 
as to provide funds through the new programmes on environment and human 
factors; 
43. Invites the Commission to participate in studies for regional development 
schemes involving these countries, as well as Thailand, as regards 
transport and communications and electricity supply; 
44. Points out that the ECIIP financial instrument (European Community 
International Investment Partners) must also be regarded as of importance 
for the countries of Indo-China; 
45. Ca 11 s on the Commission and the Governments of the Member States to 
coordinate their development efforts with regard to Laos, Vietnam and 
Cambodia; 
46. Calls on the Commission and the Governments of the Member States to urge 
the main international aid agencies to provide adequate assistance to 
these countries; 
47. Welcomes the Declaration of the ASEAN Summit in Singapore on 28 January 
1992 that 'ASEAN will play an active part in international programmes for 
the reconstruction of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia'; welcomes also the 
diplomatic moves towards accession by Laos and Vietnam to the ASEAN 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation; 
48. Welcomes the recent improvement in relations between the United States 
and Vietnam, in particular the US decision to provide humanitarian aid to 
Vietnam, and hopes that the United States wi 11 soon 1 i ft its embargo 
against Vietnam and allow the international aid agencies to furnish aid 
to Vietnam; 
49. Notes that Japan, Taiwan, the ASEAN countries and Australia are already 
developing a presence in Indochina and strongly urges that the European 
Community pursue a rapid expansion of its trade and economic relations 
with Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia without delay; 
50. Ca 11 s on the Commission to draw up an action programme setting out its 
future policy towards Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia; 
51. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Commission, the 
Council, the Governments of the Member States and to the Governments of 
Laos, Vietnam and the Supreme National Council of Cambodia. 
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B. EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The region known as Indo-China consists of three ancient countries-
Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Following half a century of French 
domination, Indo-China suffered from almost incessant conflict from the 
end of World War II until 1975. This period was especially damaging to 
Vietnam. There followed the conflict in Cambodia, lasting from 1979 
until the UN-inspired peace accords reached in October 1991. Although 
the European Community has entertained little or no relations with the 
countries of Indo-China until now, the ending of the Cold War and 
superpower rivalry in South-East Asia, the prospects of a lasting 
settlement in Cambodia and the introduction of economic reforms in all 
three countries, offer to the Community and to its Member States the 
prospect of fruitful relations with this region in future. 













Vietnam also has a far larger economy than either Laos or Cambodia in 








However, although Vietnam is relatively more developed than either 
Cambodia or Laos, all three countries are very poor compared to their 
ASEAN neighbours, placing them clearly in the list of the world 1 s 
poorest countries, as follows: 




e.g. Indonesia 490 
Malaysia 2,130 
Thailand 1,170 
The triumph of Indo-China 1 s Communist Parties, in wresting control of 
the entire region by 197 5, occurred shortly before the European 
Community began its first programmes of development cooperation for the 
countries of Asia and Latin America, in 1976. Following the brutal 
excesses committed by the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia after 19 7 5 and 
Vietnam 1 s invasion and occupation of Cambodia in 1979, the European 
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Community suspended its tentative relations with Vietnam and has been 
unable to develop relations with Cambodia. Only with Laos did useful 
cooperation, albeit on a small scale, develop from 1977 onwards. 
However, by 1988, with the introduction of the first economic reforms 
in Vietnam, the position of the European Community began to change. In 
its Resolution of 13 October 1988 (on Mr Seeler' s Report on the 
Community's relations with the non-European members of the CMEA), the 
European Parliament considered 
"that the complete withdrawal of Vietmamese forces from Kampuchea 
(Cambodia), as part of a political settlement to the present 
conflict, as well as the continuation of Vietnam's present policy 
of reforms, will enble the European Community fully to resume the 
provision of development aid to Vietnam (and moreover to 
Kampuchea) without delay and thus support both Vietnam's reform 
policy and its endeavours to achieve greater political 
independence".(4) 
In the early autumn of 1989, the Vietnamese occupation forces were 
withdrawn and in Resolutions adopted on 23 November 1989 and on 
17 May 1990,(5) the European Parliament urged the Council to accept the 
request made by the Government of Vietnam in September 1987, and 
subsequently supported by the Commission, for the opening of diplomatic 
relations with the European Community. The Council finally acceded to 
this request in November 1990 and bilateral relations have begun to 
develop slowly since then. 
As regards Cambodia, the European Community maintained its boycott 
until the settlement was reached and the development of normal 
relations must await the setting up of a new government once the UN-
supervised elections have been held. 
The European Parliament has already stated in outline its position 
regarding the develoment of the European Community's relations with the 
countries of Indo-China in its Re sol uti on of 12 September 1991 (on 
Mr Prag's Report on the situation in South-East Asia)(6). This present 
report aims to expand on this position as regards the Community's 
economic relations with Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. 
II. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 
General information regarding the political and economic background to 
the present situation in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam has already been 
provided in a Working Document submitted to the Committee on External 
Economic Relations on 13 November 1991(7). It is worth recalling some 
of the main factors contained in this Working Document. 
(a) Historical and political developments 
Vietnam and Thailand were already engaged in rivalry for influence 
over Laos and a declining Cambodia before the arrival of the French in 
the mid-19th Century. The impact of French colonial rule in Vietnam 
was much greater than their rule in Cambodia or Laos and was always 
resisted more fiercely. Following the Japanese occupation, a united 
and independent Vietnam might have emerged peacefully (ironically with 
U. S. assistance) , if agreements entered into by the French with the 
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Viet Minh had not been broken. 
By the time of the Geneva Accords, in 1954, the politics of Indo-
China had become embroiled in the Cold War, leading to rivalry between 
the Superpowers in South-East Asia. This, in turn, led to the failure 
to hold the all-Vietnam elections foreseen in the Geneva Accords, U.S. 
interference in South Vietnamese politics, the formation of the 
Communist-led National Liberation Front in the South, the commitment of 
U.S. forces to South Vietnam, the aerial bombing of the North, and the 
subsequent widening of the conflict to Cambodia and Laos and the 
destabilisation of their regimes. Once U.S. forces had been withdrawn, 
the U.S.-supported regimes in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia crumbled 
quickly, leading to the formation of Communist regimes throughout 
Indo-China in 1975. 
When Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime in Cambodia attacked Vietnam, the 
Vietnamese occupied the country in support of a rival Cambodian 
Communist faction under Hun Sen. As a result, Communist China launched 
a punitive military strike against Northern Vietnam. 
Vietnam's prolonged occupation of Cambodia not only alienated China and 
Thailand (together with the other ASEAN countries) but also the United 
States and the European Community. Vietnam, having become a member of 
the CMEA (COMECON) and having signed a Treaty of Friendship 
and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in 1978, became excessively 
dependent on both trade with, and large-scale development assistance 
from, the Soviet Union and its COMECON allies in Central and Eastern 
Europe. Much the same was true for Cambodia and Laos. The Soviet 
Union was held up, therefore, as the great role model (all other 
international players being considered - and behaving - as hostile) and 
rigorously imitated in both administration and economic policy, with 
rather catastrophic results. By comparison, the ASEAN neighbours, 
firmly in the Western camp, were booming. 
By the mid-1980's, the Governments of all three countries had begun 
programmes of economic reform. However the collapse of COMECON, the 
Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe and, finally, of the 
Soviet Union itself, created enormous disruption as regards the trade, 
balance of payments and economic development of all three countries, 
but also considerable disillusionment within their ruling eli tes. 
This facilitated the settlement of the Cambodian problem, with the 
Vietnamese military withdrawal and led to Vietnam normalising relations 
with all its neighbours, that is both with the ASEAN countries and with 
its great historic enemy, China. 
(b) Economic background 
While a Soviet-style command economy was introduced in North Vietnam 
after 1954, the introduction of such a system in South Vietnam and in 
Laos only occurred after 1975. Indeed, in spite of the war, a 
relatively booming free market economy had developed around Saigon 
during the period of U.S. military involvement. Thus it has been 
mainly Southerners in the Vietnamese leadership who have been the main 
champions of economic reform. In Cambodia, the rule of the Khmer Rouge 
" .:ually wiped out all economic activity except subsistence 
a..~riculture, while the continuing civil war since 1979 has greatly 
hampered efforts at reconstruction. 
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Economic reforms were first introduced in Laos in 1985, followed in 
1986 (after the Sixth Party Congress) by Vietnam. Although Cambodia, 
under the Hun Sen regime, was the last to begin such reforms, progress 
in this direction has been much faster than in either Laos or Cambodia. 
Agriculture remains the principal economic activity in all three 
countries, but is somewhat less predominant in more developed Vietnam 
(62.6% of the workforce) than in Cambodia (70.4%) or in Laos (72%). 
Vietnam has a great potential to develop its fishing industry, while 
forestry can be an important factor in all three countries. All three 
countries suffer from a severe shortage of energy, especially 
electricity. However, while Vietnam has substantial coal reserves and 
offshore oil is being developed, Laos has an enormous potential for the 
development of hydro-electric power, only a tiny percentage of which is 
currently exploited, and this largely for export to Thailand. The 
transport and communications infrastructure of all three countries, 
including links with each other ~nd with neighbouring countries, is 
hopelessly inadequate. 
Until very recently, the external trade of all three countries had 
been dominated by the barter system of COMECON, with little heed taken 
of real prices. The collapse of this system has left these countries 
devoid of both experience and expertise of doing business on the world 
market. The impact on Cambodia and Laos, who had little to trade in 
any case, has been less acute than on Vietnam. 
Ill. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S RELATIONS WITH LAOS 
In 1975, after many years of intermittent civil war in Laos, the 
Communist Pathet Lao emerged victorious, leading to the formation of a 
government under the People's Revolutionary Party. Vietnam maintained 
several thousand troops in Laos to shore up this regime. However, this 
did not deter the European Community from beginning a programme of 
development assistance to Laos in 1977. 
(a) Development and Economic Cooperation 
Prior to 1986, aid projects were on a very small scale. The first, to 
develop seed production, was funded under the Commission's Special 
Action Programme (the "Ortoli Facility") and was channelled, in the 
form of soft loans, through the World Bank. Two further projects, one 
relating to flood control around Vientiane, the other again for seed 
production, were implemented through the Mekong Valley Committee over a 
period from 1978 to 1990. 
However, after the introduction of the first economic reform measures 
by the Government of Laos in 1985, which began to decentralise the 
economy and reduce State subsidies, the Commission reassessed this 
position, especially as a result of the visit of Commissioner Cheysson 
to Laos in 1986. A number of "rural microprojects" for the Luang 
Prabang area were approved in 1986, as was an irrigation project for 
Ngan Ngum in 1988. Both projects were begun in 1990. Moreover two 
training projects were approved in 1988 for the Mahosot University 
Hospital in Vientiane and for vocational training for woodworking and 
carpentry. In addition, Lao government officials have undergone 
training in statistics in Germany since 1988. Other projects, under 
the heading of humanitarian aid, have included food aid, grants for the 
repatriation of Laotian refugees and measures to reduce the production 
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of opium poppies in Muang Horn and the Kasi Valley. As regards the 
refugees, for which funds have been channelled through the UNHCR, an 
agreement has been reached in 1991 between Thailand, Laos and the UNHCR 
for rural integration development projects whereby 60,000 Lao refugees 
in Thailand will be repatriated over the next three years. Finally, 
aid to Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO's) operating Laos (mainly on 
education and health care projects) has been stepped up since 1986. 
Thus, whereas between 1976-1985 European Community aid to Laos for 
these various projects totalled only ECU 9.1 million, between 1986 and 
1991 the total value of such aid had increased to ECU 30.6 million. 
An important aid project to be undertaken- in the next few years by the 
European Community, following the completion of studies, will be to 
provide additional drinking water supplies to the town of Thakhet 
through the building of an aqueduct. Other studies on the development 
of water resources and flood protection are under way. Nevertheless, 
the Commission should now increase both the scope of future development 
project and the funds available for them. 
(b) Trade 
While the European Community's Development and Economic Cooperation 
with Laos has been both useful and effective in a modest way, little or 
nothing has been achieved in improving the trade position of Laos. In 
1988, Laos had imports worth US 240 million dollars but exports worth 
only US 52 million dollars. The Soviet Union was the principal 
trading partner and the main exports were wood ( 32. 8%) , electricty 
(13.7%) and coffee (9.0%).(8) 
With the expected halving of trade with what was the Soviet Union, as 
well as a reduction in the price which Thailand pays for electricity 
supplies from Laos, the trading prospects for Laos appear to be 
particularly bleak. The great temptation, of course, is to step up the 
exploitation of the abundant forests to reduce the deficit. At 
present, the destruction of the tropical forests is proceeding in an 
uncontrolled manner, largely to satisfy the demands of the Thai logging 
interests (Thailand already having been practically denuded of its own 
forest cover). The Commission has proposed the setting up of a Timber 
Board for Laos in order to supervise the exploitation of the forests, 
so as to reduce the ecological damage. Although the Government of Laos 
has refused to accept this proposal as yet, the Commission should 
pursue the suggestion with determination. 
In addition, it is important that the Commission prepare a programme of 
measures to assist Laos to diversify its exports and to be better 
prepared to sell its products on international markets, in particular 
that of the European Community. Coffee, textiles and handicrafts 
should be targeted sectors for trade promotion, under Item B7-3001 of 
the Commission's Budget (Promotion of Trade Relations with Asian 
Developing Countries) , while marketing expertise should be provided 
under various Items under Budget Article B7-503 (Training and Education 
in the Development Field). Tourism in Laos should also be promoted. 
Both exports and tourism should be helped by the extension of 
Thailand's North-Eastern Railway across the Mekong into Vientiane in a 
few years' time. 
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(c) Diplomatic relations 
For several years, the Government of Laos was unprepared to afford 
recognition to the European Community. However, since the general 
improvement in relations after 1986, this problem has been overcome and 
the Ambassador of Laos in Paris is now accredited to the European 
Community. In turn, the Commission's representative in Bangkok is now 
accredited to the Government in Vientiane. 
In its Resolution of 12 September 1991, referred to earlier, the 
European Parliament asked the Commission "to envisage a trade and 
cooperation agrement with Laos, which would provide increased aid from 
the Community with a particular view to improving the country's 
position on world markets". This is certainly the goal which the 
European Community should pursue. However, while it may be some time 
before the Government of Laos is ready to discuss such an agreement 
with the Community, this should not delay the provision of greater aid 
to Laos by the Community. 
The same Resolution also suggeted that a "political dialogue at 
parliamentary level" should be established with Laos and it is to be 
expected that the competent authorities in the European Parliament are 
already taking steps to implement this suggestion. 
IV. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM 
(a) 1979-1989 
Following Vietnam's military occupation of Cambodia in January 1979, 
the European Council meeting in the Hague decided to freeze all aid to 
Vietnam. This position was reiterated, for example, in a joint 
Ministerial statement with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers, in October 
1986, where it was stated that no assistance should be given to Vietnam 
which might "support and encourage its occupation of Kampuchea". 
Nevertheless, encouraged by the European Parliament, the Commission did 
see fit to provide some emergency aid and food aid following typhoon 
damage in coastal areas, e.g. after Typhoon Wayne in October 1986. 
(b) Since 1989 
The withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia in September 1989 
opened the way for the normalisation of relations with the European 
Community in November 1990. Since then the Commission has given 
priority to assisting the United Kingdom to solve the problem of the 
large number of Vietnamese refugees who have fled, mostly be sea, to 
Hong Kong. Although criticism has been levelled at the Hong Kong 
authorities for the methods used to "screen" the genuine "political 
refugees" from mere "economic refugees", it is clear that, for the most 
part, returning refugees face no threat of retribution from the 
Vietnamese authorities. Indeed, the Government of Vietnam is most 
content with the remittances which are sent to families in Vietnam from 
"boat people" who have succeeded in settling in Western countries. The 
Commission's project to assist with this repatriation and reintegration 
of the refugees has been quite substantial, amounting to ECU 12. 5 
million from its starting in April 1991 up to March 1992. Moreover, the 
reintegration aspect of the projects makes a significant contribution 
towards stimulating the local economy. 
- 15 - PE 1 55 • 3 53 I fin. 
(c) Future Development Aid 
However, the success of this programme does not excuse the fact that, 
until now, no project aid has been provided by the Commission to 
Vietnam under the main Budget i tern for cooperation with Asian 
Developing Countries, namely Item B7-3000 (Financial and Technical 
Cooperation). Nevertheless, following the visit of a high level 
delegation of Commission officials to Hanoi in February/March 1992, it 
is to be hoped that a number of projects will now be identified for 
which European Community aid can be made available. 
Vietnam's economy is seriously affected, at present, by an acute labour 
surplus resulting from the demobilisation of some 600, 000 soldiers 
after the withdrawal from Cambodia, the redundancy of 500,000 civil 
servants due to economic decentralisation, as well as many thousands of 
returning guest workers from former COMECON countries. This has 
compounded its earlier difficulties resulting from a dilapidated 
infrastructure, obsolescent heavy industry and acute shortages of 
electricity. Therefore, the sort of schemes of interest to the 
Vietnamese include labour intensive rural development and resettlement 
projects to develop coffee and pineapple production and projects to 
develop fisheries for export (especially shrimps and prawns). Indeed, 
with its long coastline, the fisheries sector could be substantially 
expanded and the European Community could assist with integrated 
fishery development programmes, such as have been provided for certain 
ACP countries. Vietnam's coastline is also highly conducive to the 
development of tourism which the Community should also assist. Another 
priority area is forestry where it must be recalled that Vietnam has 
the potential to develop some 10 million hectares of land, most of 
which was denuded of its forest cover during the U.S. air bombing with 
chemical defoliants in the early 1970s. Funds available under Budget 
Item B7-5041 (Funds to promote tropical forests) might be usefully 
employed here. The Commission should also provide food aid in milk 
products to Vietnam (Article B7-201) to assist under-privileged 
children. 
On the other hand, the Commission has been providing funds to NGOs 
operating in Vietnam, for which a special Budget line (Item B7-5074) 
has been established, with ECU 2 million provided in 1991 and ECU 1.5 
million in 1992. This should not preclude access to the general NGO 
fund (Article B7-501), if enough suitable projects are put forward. 
(d) Trade Cooperation 
The other area where cooperation with Vietnam has yet to be developed 
is trade. In 1988, Vietnam had exports worth US 1,668 million dollars 
while its impart bill amounted to US 4,360 million. Again, as with 
Laos, most of the trade was with the Soviet Union and other COMECON 
countries. While the large trade deficit was partly offset by Soviet 
aid of about 1 billion roubles per annum, both the aid and a 
substantial part of the trade has ended and what remains with the 
successor States must now be conducted using hard currency rather than 
by barter which was often on terms advantageous to the Vietnamese. 
Viet.~ ~•n' s programme of economic reforms, which are to be enshrined in 
the new Constitution, aims to transform.Vietnam into a market economy 
and has already brought about market prices, given Vietnamese the 
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right to own the means of production and to start enterprises and joint 
ventures and has provided guarantees to foreign investors. These 
reforms have won the praise of the President of the International 
Monetary Fund. However, for these reforms to be effective, Vietnam 
needs to acquire a body of officials and business managers who are 
familiar with the problems and opportunities of trading on the open 
international market, including the Community's market. Here the 
Commission should make use of its training and education budget 
(Article B7-503), including instruction in exploiting the Community's 
Generalised System of Preferences (Item B7-5030). Vietnam also needs 
assistance to develop a viable tax system and to implement the new laws 
which have been adopted to protect and stimulate the private sector. 
Where possible, such training should be conducted and eo-financed with 
other organisations specialising in the field. 
The Government of Vietnam is keen to open negotiations with the 
European Community with a view to concluding a framework cooperation 
agreement. On this question, the European Parliament stated, in its 
Resolution of 12 September 1991, that Vietnam's process of political 
liberalization should be resumed "in particular to ensure respect for 
human rights, including the release of political prisoners, in order 
that the Commission is in a position to negotiate a trade and 
cooperation agreement with Vietnam". Since then, almost all the 
remaining political prisoners have been released, a more liberal press 
law has been introduced, greater liberalisation in the electoral 
process for the forthcoming National Assembly elections has been 
provided, and the separation of the roles of State and Communist Party 
has been brought about to ensure that the Party is made subject to the 
Rule of Law. Clearly, this fulfills the condition placed by Parliament 
on the negotiation of such an agreement and the Commission should now 
begin to prepare a negotiating mandate. However, remaining human 
rights cases should be kept under review by the Commission during the 
process of negotiations. 
Pending the negotiation and conclusion of a framework cooperation 
agreement, the Commission should conclude a specific agreement on 
trade in textiles with Vietnam. Although Vietnam already has the use 
of some export quotas to the Community, textiles is a sector where 
Vietnam could develop an export trade to the Community, partly with 
trade diverted from former COMECON countries. While a textile 
agreement would contain ceiling provisions on some sensitive items such 
as "jeans", other items would be limited only by market demand. 
Given support, Vietnam has the potential to develop into an interesting 
trading partner for the European Community because of its underused 
natural resources and surplus of skilled labour. Industrial growth 
has already reached 7% per annum. The Commission should encourage 
European Community enterprises to invest in Vietnam, especially through 
joint ventures and, once a cooperation agreement is concluded, should 
extend the EC Investment Partners Programme (the "Cheysson Facility") 
to Vietnam for this purpose. 
(e) Diplomatic relations 
Following the normalisation of relations with the European Community, 
Vietnam opened a new embassy in Brussels for their accredited 
Ambassador. The Commission's relations. with the Government in Hanoi 
are currently conducted by the Commission's representative in Bangkok. 
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Once a framework agreement has been concluded, the Commission could 
consider the possibility of setting up an office in Hanoi. However the 
European Parliament has already expressed a wish to begin an 
interparliamentary dialogue with Vietnam (Resolution of 12 September 
1991) and this should begin without delay. 
V. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S RELATIONS WITH CAMBODIA 
(a) 1975 - 1989 
European Community's relations with Cambodia, since the late 1970s, 
have been determined by interntional political factors, rather than by 
the pressing needs of the Khmer people. A brief explanation is 
necessary. 
During the rule of Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge, from 1975 until the end of 
1978, all bourgeois, land-owning and liberal elements were eliminated, 
as was anyone who resisted the policy of returning Cambodia to a land 
of subsistence agriculture. It is estimated that over 1 million Khmers 
perished in this process, either from starvation, epidemics or mass 
executions. In addition, the new Khmer Government launched aggressive 
attacks against its neighbours, Thailand and Vietnam, both of which had 
seized Cambodian territory in earlier centuries. 
However, in May 1978 China arranged a truce between the Khmer Rouge and 
the Thai Government, thus enabling Pol Pot to concentrate his forces 
against Vietnam. By this time, an anti-Pol Pot faction of the 
Cambodian Communists had sought sanctuary in Vietnam and had urged the 
Vietnamese to intervene to protect the Khmers against further acts of 
genocide. As the Khmer Rouge divisions approached Ho Chi Minh City 
(Saigon), the Vietnamese Government, claiming the right of self-
defence, launched a full-scale invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 
and completed the military occupation of the country by January 1979. 
The Vietnamese then placed the leader of the anti-Pol Pot faction, Hun 
Sen, as Prime Minister of a new People's Republic of Kampuchea. 
For the Vietnamese Government, having friendly regimes in Cambodia and 
Laos, both backed by the presence of Vietnamese forces, marked a 
significant step forward towards the creation of a Federation of Indo-
China under Vietnamese leadership. For the Thai authorities, this was 
totally unacceptable, particularly in view of the long historical 
rivalry between Thailand and Vietnam for influence over Cambodia and 
Laos. For the Chinese Government, whose relations with the Vietnamese 
had increasingly soured during the 1970s as their relations with the 
United States improved, Vietnam's military occupation of Cambodia was 
equally unacceptable. As China's principal enemy was now the Soviet 
Union, having an aggressive Soviet ally on its southern flank was 
alarming. Thus China launched a punitive military attack on the 
northern provinces of Vietnam, in February 1979. 
The Governments of China and Thailand now colluded by providing 
sanctuaries for Pol Pot's remaining forces on the Thai-Cambodian border 
(often in the guise of refugee camps) , with China supplying large 
quantities of arms to the Khmer Rouge. Moreover, the United States, 
still smarting from the Vietnam War, and now in alliance with China 
against the Soviet Union, stepped up its aid to the other Cambodian 
opposition groups under Prince Sihanouk and the pro-Western Khmer 
People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF). This led to the formation 
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of the so-called Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) 
linking the Sihanouk.ists, the KPNLF and the Khmer Rouge, under the 
Prince's titular leadership, in 1982. 
The European Community was under great pressure, therefore, not only 
from its friends in ASEAN and from China, but also from the United 
States, both to break. off all relations with Vietnam and to isolate the 
new Cambodian Government under Hun Sen. Instead the Community accorded 
diplomatic recognition to the Coalition Government under Prince 
Sihanouk.. In addition, the Community launched a substantial programme 
of assistance, in the form of humanitarian aid (food aid, health care, 
education and training) to Cambodian refugees in the camps along the 
Thai -Cambodian border. This aid, provided mainly through the U. N. 
Bureau for Refugee Organisations, amounted to over ECU 25 million in 
the initial period (1979-1980) and has continued in a more modest, but 
significant way since (amounting to around ECU 50 million in 1981-
1991), mainly in the form of cereals (rice) -supplied with the help of 
the UNHCR - and, more recently, dried fish. About 350,000 refugees 
have been assisted in this programme. However, a second programme has 
also provided aid to around 170,000 displaced persons inside Cambodia. 
This aid, channelled through NGOs operating in Cambodia, again had its 
major impact in 1979-1980, when over ECU 37.6 million was awarded in 
emergency aid and around ECU 49 million in food aid. Since then, 
emergency aid and food aid together has totalled around ECU 28 million 
( 1981 -1991 ) . 
(b) Since 1989 
Whatever the efforts of the European Community, the United States or 
the ASEAN countries may have been to resolve the crisis in Cambodia, 
the two key protagonists have been Vietnam and China. Between 1979 and 
1991, their bilateral conflict has been fought out in the hills and in 
the paddy fields of Cambodia. Only a change of position by both 
parties could lead to a lasting settlement. 
The first to change course was Vietnam. By the mid-1980s, many in the 
ruling Communist Party had realised that the application of Soviet-
style economic policies, rather than solving Vietnam's economic 
problems, was making them worse. Also, Soviet aid, though massive, was 
often unreliable. It was, therefore, essential for Vietnam to bring an 
end to its international isolation and to begin to rebuild bridges to 
the outside world. The Foreign Minister, Nguyen Co Thach, began to 
promote a normalisation of relations with all parties - the ASEAN 
countries, China and the Western countries. Moreover, after a 
particularly successful campaign against the Khmer Rouge forces during 
the dry season of 1984-1985, confidence in the army of the Hun Sen 
Government increased. This led to the withdrawal of Vietnam's armed 
forces from Cambodia in September 1989. 
However, in spite of a number of promising negotiations between the 
various concerned parties, culminating in the International Conference 
in Paris in 1989, the Chinese remained adamant that the Hun Sen regime, 
together with its army, should disappear to make way for the CGDK under 
Prince Sihanouk.. This was quite unacceptable to the Vietnamese, given 
that the only effective fighting force in the Coalition Government was 
the Khmer Rouge. Two dramatic events caused the Chinese Government to 
change its position. The first was the crushing of the Democracy 
Movement at Tian-An-Men Square, in 1989, which quite alienated China's 
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Western allies. The second was the US-Soviet rapprochement and the 
declaration of a "new international order" by the United States, 
following the Gulf War in early 1991. Now China was isolated and, in 
order to regain international acceptability, the Chinese Government 
agreed to a compromise over Cambodia, leading to the start of the 
implementation of the UN-Peace Plan in October 1991. 
This gradual improvement in the political situation encouraged the 
Commission to expand somewhat its activities in Cambodia. Since 1987, 
a number of specific development projects have been carried out through 
NGOs. The level of this aid increased after the Paris Agreements of 
October 1991 and the setting up of the Supreme National Co~cil under 
Prince Sihanouk. Aid was also provided in 1991, under the heading of 
natural disaster relief, when the long period of drought was followed 
by serious flooding. In January 1992, the Commission pledged ECU 10 
million for the repatriation of Cambodian refugees, as part of a UNHCR 
programme. ECU 350,000 is being provided for a study on the 
reintegration of these refugees. ECU 1 million will be spent on a 
joint project with Belgium and Finland for aerial photography, given 
the present unreliability (or non-existence) of maps. Also, the very 
serious problem of mine clearance is under study with experts from the 
Member States. 
(c) Tasks ahead 
Although this is an encouraging start, it should be realised that this 
aid amounts to a "drop in the ocean" in comparison to Cambodia 1 s 
present needs. In spite of the rapid economic liberalisation which has 
taken place during the latter years of the Hun Sen regime (which 
extends the free market even to banking and insurance), and a recent 
increase in foreign investment activity in Phnom Penh (mainly in real 
estate and hotel construction), the Cambodian economy is in a truly 
desperate state. Five years of involvement in the Vietnam War was 
followed by nearly four years of economic implosion under Pol Pot, in 
turn succeded by 12 years of civil war and international isolation, 
save for some assistance from the Soviet Union. That assistance, worth 
around us 100 million dollars per annum, no longer exists and with it 
has gone cheap supplies of oil, fertiliser and raw materials. The area 
under rice cultivation has fallen from 2.4 million hectares in 1969 to 
1.8 million hectares in 1991, due to the civil war. Inflation is 
growing out of control and there is a severe shortage of trained people 
to administer the economy and to attempt to organise Cambodia 1 s 
international trade. In effect, Cambodia now lacks all the elements of 
a basic national infrastructure. 
The international community, of which the European Community is an 
important part, now has a moral obligation to assist the people of 
Cambodia. Indeed, if Cambodia is to survive, both under UN 
Administration and, later, under a new elected Cambodian Government, it 
will have to be more or less "spoon fed" by the international community 
on a considerable scale for several years. The European Community, 
which has effectively boycotted Cambodia for over a decade - a policy 
conducted more 1n the interests of China and the ASEAN countries than 
to l'--- ef it the Community 1 s own interests - should now play its full 
par' in these efforts. It should support the recent Japanese proposal 
to hold an international conference on the reconstruction of Cambodia. 
Of course, for the time being, there i~ no real Cambodian government 
with which formal relations can be entertained, but this should in no 
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way impede the Commission from using its various budgetary instruments 
to provide assistance as effectively as possible. In the initial 
phase, the emphasis should be on food aid, humanitarian assistance and 
training. There is a pressing need for doctors and vets to be sent, as 
well as qualified engineers to help rebuild irrigation works and 
restore village water supplies. Also, aid given through NGOs should be 
increased but not to the detriment of pursuing an overall strategy in 
which direct Community project aid should play an important part. 
In this regard, the European Parliament's Resolution of 12 September 
1991 should be recalled, in particular its appeal to the Commission to 
draw up "a programme of economic and technical cooperation ... to help 
restore the country's essential infrastructure". The statement issued 
by the European Community's Member States meeting in European Political 
Cooperation on 8 November 1991, indicating their readiness to make 
available contributions to help the peace process in Cambodia through 
economic and financial assistance, both for the repatriation and 
rehabilitation programme and for the reconstruction of Cambodia, is to 
be welcomed. Finally, however, it should be stressed that the people 
of Cambodia must be given the perspective that international aid will 
be provided on a long term basis. Only in this way will the necessary 
confidence be restored to enable the people of Cambodia to begin to 
help themselves. 
VI. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S RELATIONS 
WITH THE COUNTRIES OF INDO-CHINA 
Although Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia are among the poorest of the 
developing countries of Asia and Latin America (the ALA countries), 
Laos alone has received aid on a small scale since the European 
Community began its programme of development cooperation with these ALA 
countries after 1976. Vietnam and Cambodia were deprived of such 
assistance until very recently. 
For the sake of comparison, it is interesting to consider the total 
value of aid given to Laos in recent years with that provided to a 










Total EC aid (9) 
(1986-1990) 
ECU 27.3 mio. 
ECU 58.5 mio. 
Apart from the specific proposals already mentioned, it must be 
stressed that Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia should now be given an 
equitable share of European Community aid, especially under the main 
Budget Item 87-3000 (Financial and Technical Cooperation with Asian 
Developing Countries) . Secondly, emphasis should be given to the 
value of training in the next few years, using Items 87-3004 (Training 
Operations for Nationals of Asian Developing Countries) and Article 87-
503 (Training and Education in the Development Field). Thirdly, the 
Commission should also employ funds from the new development policy 
areas. As regards "Environment and Health in Developing Countries" 
(Article 87-504), the emphasis should be on helping the three countries 
to develop policies of sustainability in the exploitation of their 
forests. Also, as regards "Human Factors in Development", use should 
be made of Item 87-5050 - Aid for population policies (particularly for 
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Vietnam) and Item B7-5052 - Women in Development. 
The European Community can also play a small but important role in the 
development of infrastructure and energy. The problem of the 
inadequacy of roads, railways, inland waterways and telecommunications 
is, in part, a regional one - also involving the need for better links 
with Thailand. For example, the project to build a railway from Ho Chi 
Minh City (Saigon) the relatively short distance to Phnom Penh (about 
150 kilometres) would ef fecti vel y serve to join Vietnam's railway 
system through Cambodia to Thailand's extensive network, permitting 
trains to run though to Bangkok (and even onwards to Singapore). Thus, 
the Commission could usefully assist with undertaking a pre-feasibility 
study for better regional infrastructure links. In addition, given the 
vast potential of Laos to expand its production of hydro-electric power 
to supply much of the future needs of Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand, 
the Commission could also help with studies for the regional 
development of electricity supply. For such schemes, use could be made 
of Budget Items B?-3002 (Measures to encourage regional or sub-regional 
integration between Asian Developing Countries) and B7-3003 
(Cooperation with Asian Developing Countries on Energy). 
Of course, the financial capacity of the European Community to assist 
with such major projects must not be exaggerated, nor even to provide 
aid for smaller projects on more than a limited scale. However, these 
weaknesses can partly be overcome in two ways. First, the Commission 
and the Governments of the Member States should try, as far as 
possible, to dovetail their respective aid efforts so as to have 
greater impact. Secondly, the Community as a whole should press for 
substantial sums to be provided for development aid for Laos, Vietnam 
and Cambodia through the major international aid agencies, in 
particular the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the Mekong 
Valley Committee, especially in the form of soft loans. Also, the IMF 
should assist these countries to overcome their foreign debt problems. 
However, this last point raises the question of the political 
conditions attached to providing aid to these countries. 
VII. POLITICAL CONDITIONS FOR IMPROVING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY'S RELATIONS 
WITH THE COUNTRIES OF INDO-CHINA 
If the European Community has given so little help to the countries of 
Indo-China since the late 1970s, this is partly due to their having 
been under Communist rule and partly due to Vietnam's perceived 
aggression in Cambodia. Undoubtedly, however, it has also been due to 
considerable diplomatic pressure having been put on the Community and 
its Member States by the Governments of China, the ASEAN countries and 
the United States. 
Following the brutal repression of the Democracy Movement in Tian-An-
Men Square, the Chinese Government is no longer in a position to offer 
advice to the European Community as regards foreign policy. 
As for the ASEAN countries, they were always more concerned by 
Vietnam's expansionist policies with regard to Laos and Cambodia than 
by Vietnam's internal developments. The attitude of the ASEAN 
countries towards Vietnam has changed dramatically with the settlement 
of the problem of Cambodia. Indeed, in their Declaration following 
their Summit Meeting in Singapore, on 28 January 1992, the ASEAN 
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Leaders stated that "ASEAN will play an active part in international 
programmes for the reconstruction of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia". 
Moreover, in a flurry of diplomatic activity, the ASEAN countries, 
Vietnam and Laos are working towards the accession of Vietnam and Laos 
to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of 1976. It is hoped that 
Cambodia may also be in a position to sign this Treaty later, which is 
seen as a stepping stone to all three countries joining ASEAN at some 
future stage. 
Finally, there is the United States which, throughout the 1980s, 
maintained an embargo on both Vietnam and Cambodia which effectively 
prevented aid from reaching either of them from the main international 
donor agencies. Large funds from these agencies are essential for 
financing major infrastructure projects. Now, however, even the US 
position is changing. The embargo on Cambodia was lifted in 1991. As 
regards Vietnam, relations are still impeded by the issue of the MIA's 
(former US servicemen who went "missing in action" and who are still 
unaccounted for). This emotive issue is greatly exaggerated by the 
United States due to the sensitivity of American public opinion. 
However, following four visits of the special presidential envoy, 
General Vessey, to Hanoi, who is pursuing a "road map" towards a 
normalisation of US-Vietnamese relations, the us Government announced 
in March 1992 the award of US 3 million dollars in humanitarian aid to 
Vietnam. Although it may be difficult for the US Government to lift 
the embargo during an election year, this will surely come soon, and 
U1e European Community should encourage the United States in this 
direction. 
Within the European Community, other arguments are put up to deter an 
improvement in relations with the countries of Indo-China : economic 
reforms have not gone far enough, the political systems are not 
democratic, there are still abuses of human rights. Such arguments 
require examination. 
In fact, the Governments of all three countries are embarked on 
programmes of economic reforms aimed at growing liberalisation. By and 
large, these reforms have been successful which, in turn, encourages 
further reform measures. However, this trend away from central 
planning and state ownership is not confined to the Communist countries 
of Asia but can be found also in India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, 
and so on. Economic lessons are being learned. 
Secondly, although parliamentary democracy is very limited in both Laos 
and Vietnam by western standards (it may come to Cambodia if the UN 
plan is successfully carried out), the situation is not worse than in a 
number of other Asian countries with which the European Community has 
happily concluded cooperation agreements - China, or the Philippines 
(as part of the ASEAN cooperation agreement), concluded during the 
Marcos era (not to mention certain countries in Latin America). 
Moreover, political liberalisation is continuing slowly in Laos and 
Vietnam. Respect for human rights is far from satisfactory, but 
neither is it satisfactory in China or in several other countries in 
South and South-East Asia. A major problem in much of this region is 
the absence of the Western concept of a "loyal opposition" which 
results, in part, from the effects of the Cold War struggle in the 
region and, in certain countries (including Vietnam), is due to the 
still pervading ideas of Confucianism. The European Community is right 
to continue to put pressure on these countries to improve their 
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democracy and their respect for human rights but this should not 
prevent the Community from developing normal relations, including 
contractual relations, with Laos and Vietnam, and with Cambodia once 
the new government is established. 
Already Japan, Taiwan, the ASEAN countries and Australia are rapidly 
developing a presence in this region. The three countries of Indo-
China all want the European Community to play an active and important 
role, both for the benefits which bilateral relations will bring, but 
also as a counterweight to Japan, China and the United States in the 
region. Hitherto, the European Community has neglected the countries 
of Indo-China, its policy has been determined mainly by others and it 
has left others to exert influence in the region. This must change and 
the European Community should no longer hesitate to undertake a rapid 
expansion of its relations with Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia and to 
encourage the Community's private sector to do the same. The 
Commission should now draw up an action programme setting out its 
future policy towards Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia. 
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure 
by Mr VISSER 
on the economic and commercial relations between the European Community and 
Indochina (Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) 
The European Parliament, 
A. whereas in its resolution of 17 May 1990 it requested to resume 
diplomatic and commercial relations between the EEC and Vietnam, 
B. whereas it has also requested the Community aid for development to be 
carried out; whereas two new budgetary items (87-5074 and 87-5075) have 
been added in order to provide the NGOs with the necessary resources to 
conduct the reintegration and repatriation of 'boat people', 
C. considers that the economic development of these countries could be one 
of the most important factors to reduce the migration of 'boat people, 
D. whereas the strength of traditional relations between the European 
Community and the above mentioned countries as well as the potentialities 
of the Indochina's market, 
E. whereas the EEC has decided to reestablish diplomatic relations with 
Vietnam, 
1. Instructs its relevant committee to study the evolution of the economic 
and commercial relations between the European Community and Indochina 
(Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia). 
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